Cognition around the world by Barbara GÃ¶tsch
BOOK REVIEW
published: 10 October 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01149
Cognition around the world
Barbara Götsch*
Institute for Social Anthropology, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Austria
*Correspondence: barbara.goetsch@oeaw.ac.at
Edited by:
Eddy J. Davelaar, Birkbeck College, UK
Reviewed by:
Joachim Funke, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany
Keywords: cognition, psychology, socio-cultural anthropology, universality, cultural variability
A book review on
Die Welt des Denkens: kognitive Einheit, kulturelle Vielfalt
Edited by Andrea Bender and Sieghard Beller, Bern: Verlag Hans Huber, 2012. ISBN-13: 978-3456852249
Die Welt des Denkens: Kognitive Einheit,
kulturelle Vielfalt, may be translated as
“The world of thinking: cognitive unity,
cultural diversity.” It represents an impres-
sive and much needed effort in German
at bringing together insights from psy-
chology and socio-cultural anthropology
about how people around the globe per-
ceive and order the world and how they
feel and reason about the world surround-
ing them. The book is extraordinary in
both scope and depth, it is lucidly written
and, thanks to its thoughtful structure, it is
accessible for a broad audience.
Eight areas that mental activity is
directed at are addressed in particular: (1)
color perception (2) the classification of
plants and animals (3) logical reasoning
(4) counting and calculating (5) spatial
reasoning (6) reasoning about time (6)
navigating the sea (7) social cognition and
perspective taking (8) emotions. The dif-
ferent areas are treated in distinct chapters,
preceded by an introduction outlining the
scholarly study of cognition and culture
and giving an overview of the book, and
followed by a comprehensive conclusion
and three different indices, including one
on “countries, languages, and cultures.”
Very much in the style of a textbook,
the individual chapters all follow a sim-
ilar structure. They provide information
on a cognitive phenomenon, first detail-
ing what is known about it from aWestern
psychological or natural science perspec-
tive, and then putting this in relation
with studies that may roughly be grouped
as appertaining to the field of cognitive
anthropology. The latter focus on how
people in remote places of the world
approach the same issue. As one might
expect the respective results look quite dif-
ferent. The authors then engage with this
difference and draw conclusions about the
way culture and cognition interact. This
is supplemented with a one page info box
detailing general ethnographic knowledge
about the specific society that appears to
do this or that differently. In addition,
each paragraph is complemented with key-
words in the margins, pointing to the
main information presented. The chapters
are concluded with two service sections:
one offering tasks or thought experiments
that the reader may perform, the other
providing suggestions for further reading.
We learn, for example, that the
Tarahumara in Mexico use only one term
to denote blue and green (siyó), and that
the Inca, rather than using a script, used
a highly differentiated notation system
(quipu) of strings and knots to calculate
and archive numerical knowledge con-
cerning the community. We also learn that
Australian Aborigines have a nearly per-
fect sense of direction in vast places such
as the desert, where non-Aborigines would
hardly find their way. This seems to result
from a preference for an absolute frame of
reference according to north, east, south
and west rather than a relative one (as in
“left,” “right”), which is also reflected in
language and gesture. In addition, they
orient themselves according to specificities
in the landscape, which are laden with cul-
tural memories. Samoa, then, is given as
an example of a place where people refrain
from overt speculation about the thoughts
and feelings of others, which in turn has
consequences for the way causality and
accountability are explained.
The authors come to the conclusion
that no clear-cut picture can be drawn as to
the exact interrelation of culture and cog-
nition. This is to do with difficulties in the
methodological comparability of studies,
the lack of studies addressing similar ques-
tions about people in different parts of the
world, and generally the sheer scope of the
problem, i.e., what aspect of cognition in
relation to what aspect of culture is being
addressed.
Some circumstances are described as
consequential, however. Cultural prefer-
ences and environmental requirements
seem to create differences in the ways peo-
ple categorize, quantify and explain the
world, and in how they orient themselves
in the world. Also, schooling and liter-
acy seem to have a strong influence on
the ways in which the world is classified
and causality is explained; furthermore,
many recent and more refined studies
support the old argument that language
influences thought and perception (as in
spatial reasoning). Overall, the authors
argue that many differences in reasoning
activity point to differences in quantity
rather than quality, i.e., that the cognitive
abilities are indeed universal but used in
various styles, intensities and at different
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points in a person’s development. This
means for example that the Aboriginal
sense of direction could be learned by
members of another society, and that the
Samoans could learn to impute the mental
states of others at an earlier age were they
encouraged to do so.
The authors, thus, come to the con-
clusion that human cognition is indeed
strongly universal, allowing for some cul-
tural variability. To my mind, from an
anthropological perspective that is, the
book somewhat ambivalently stresses the
dichotomy of universality vs. cultural vari-
ability. This dichotomy shines forth on the
title page, when at the same time the intro-
ductory chapter makes clear that things are
not as universal as they appear to be. Also,
the authors refer to the debate about the
computer-inspired metaphor of content
and process, and state that this distinction
is artificial when it comes to the relation-
ship between culture and the mind/body.
By contrast, some recent anthropological
thinking about the dynamic historical and
biosocial character of human life rather
tries to do away with this dual perspective
and tries to highlight the developmental—
and simultaneously cultural—plasticity of
the mind and the body (Astuti and Bloch,
2010; Ingold and Palsson, 2013).
Along this line, the role of participa-
tion in social events, distributed cognition
and embodiment could have been elabo-
rated somemore. Two areas that are highly
interesting but are missing altogether as a
topic in their own right are intercultural
differences in approaches to causal reason-
ing and problem solving. They are touched
upon in discussions about logical reason-
ing, navigation, perspective taking, and
emotion, but are waiting to be explored
further. It is therefore not surprising that
the authors initiated a research program
on the cultural constitution of causal cog-
nition and co-edited a special issue of
Frontiers in Psychology on this topic.
The book is structured pedagogically
and discusses a vast amount of literature
from the growing interdisciplinary field
of cognition and culture. It seems partic-
ularly designed for students of psychol-
ogy in their specialization phase but it
will also appeal to students and teachers
of socio-cultural anthropology, linguistics,
and human biology, as well as to readers
from other areas of the cognitive sciences,
or from fields such as human geography
and human ecology.
To conclude, the book aims at illus-
trating the intricate relationship between
cognition and culture, and opens up an
opportunity for dialogue between the dis-
ciplines of psychology and anthropology.
It is highly informative and very well-
structured. In its effort to try to give
answers, it neglects to ask questions and
theorize, however; which—at least for
anthropologists—would make this book
an even better read.
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